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Writing for a symposium in comparative constitutional law I wish to address three
aspects of constitutional and political context upfront:
First, discussing „bicameralism“ with regard to German constitutional law means
to conceive of the German federal parliament (Bundestag) as the “first chamber”
and the representative organ of the 16 German states (Bundesrat) as the “second
chamber”.
Second, there are significant differences in the institutional design of both chambers.
The Bundestag is elected in general elections through a mixed electoral system.
The 598 plus seats are finally allocated through proportional representation of
the political parties that capture 5% or more of the federal vote. Along the general
model of parliamentary democracy the Bundestag elects the federal prime minister
(Bundeskanzler) who nominates the cabinet members. The Bundesrat, however,
does not originate from a direct popular vote. Rather, it is comprised of delegations
of the 16 state governments, the size of which varies according to the size of state
populations: Small states such as Bremen or Saarland have the minimum number of
3 seats, large states such as Bavaria or North-Rhine Westfalia the maximum number
of 6 seats in the Bundesrat. The preeminent political players in these delegations
are the state prime ministers. Thus, in its institutional composition the Bundesrat
is an executive organ, although with important legislative functions. The German
federal constitution (Grundgesetz) grants the right to sponsor federal legislation, but
differentiates powers when it comes to enactment. At present, the Bundesrat has
the right to veto about 40% and to simply reject about 60% of federal statutes, with
override powers of the Bundestag being limited to the latter option.
Third, some key features of the German party system are important: Since the
founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 all the federal prime ministers
and more than 90 percent of the state prime ministers originated from the two
major German parties – the conservative CDU/CSU on the one hand and the social
democratic SPD on the other. Regularly, both federal and state prime ministers
simultaneously hold the office of chairman of their political party on the relevant
level. However, on the federal level, throughout the history of the Federal Republic
of Germany, with one rare exception (CDU/CSU 1957), no party ever gained a
majority of the popular vote by itself. Rather, party coalitions had and have to be
built. Coalition building follows two alternative scenarios: In the first scenario, which
has been practiced for most of the first 50 years of the Federal Republic, one of
the major parties sides with a smaller party such as the liberal FDP or the ecologist
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. In the following, I will refer to this scenario as a “small
coalition”. In the second scenario, the major parties side with each other in a “grand
coalition” (Grosse Koalition). This second scenario (for reasons I cannot elaborate
on at this point) has become increasingly common. In recent years, a grand coalition
governed on the federal level from 2005-2009 and does so again since 2013.
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That being said, two very different faces of German bicameralism emerge –
depending on which of the two scenarios of coalition building takes hold within a
particular time frame.
On the one hand, in times of small coalitions the face of bicameralism oftentimes
expresses conflict and stalemate. This is particularly true for times in which the
major opposition party in the Bundestag holds a potential majority of votes in the
Bundesrat (through members of their party in the positions of state prime ministers).
For example, the mid 1990s and early 2000s experienced periods of Blockadepolitik,
in which a stable majority in the Bundesrat systematically blocked legislative
initiatives of Bundesregierung and Bundestag along party lines. This experience
became a major motivational point for constitutional reform in the 2000s, when
two major reform packages (“federalism reform I and II”), inter alia, reduced the
number of federal statutes requiring consent of the Bundesrat. Moreover, times of
small coalitions are also times of constitutional conflict. In recent years, all important
bicameralism cases decided by the Bundesverfassungsgericht fall into this category.
For example, in the case of the federal immigration law enacted by SPD and
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in 2002 the passing of the statute in the Bundesrat hinged
upon the contested vote of Brandenburg. Small coalition governments also sparked
a line of cases concerning the conciliation committee (Vermittlungsausschuss) and
its constitutional mandate to resolve political conflicts between both chambers.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht requested modifications of the narrow majority
vote of the Bundestag of 2004 concerning the allocation of seats in the conciliation
committee in favor of the then-opposition parties CDU/CSU and FDP. Most recently,
the Bundesverfassungsgericht decided a case dating back to 2003 distinguishing
the committee’s reconciliation competences from the right of initiative reserved to
the Bundestag, Bundesrat and Bundesregierung, affirming earlier cases concerning
1997 and 1995 statutes.
On the other hand, there is the very different face of bicameralism in times of
grand coalitions. The common government of the major parties and the underlying
legislative “super-majority” is rarely opposed systematically by a majority in the
Bundesrat – which is no surprise, given that at least one of the grand coalition
parties on the federal level is regularly part of any German state government.
Thus, the face of bicameralism appears much less marked by conflict, but is more
businesslike and compromise-oriented. Accordingly, the extended experience with
grand coalitions in recent years did not result in major bicameralism cases brought
before the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Rather, the most significant constitutional
conflicts among federal institutions concerned parliamentary rights of the opposition.
To what extent is the emergence of two alternating faces of German bicameralism
a question of constitutional law? On the first view, there seems a purely political
process at work. The formation of a small or a grand coalition, one might say, does
not follow from the constitution, but from election results. On the second view,
however, it becomes clear that constitutional law plays a hugely important role: In
the drafting process of the Grundgesetz in 1948/1949 conception and function of the
second federal chamber were heavily contested. The main alternative to the codified
model of a Bundesrat was the model of a Senate comprised of an equal number of
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independent individuals elected by each state legislature (at one point, the number
of 6 senators/p. state was suggested). A constitutional decision in this direction
would have altered the political dynamics of German bicameralism significantly. Most
importantly, the second chamber would have gained internal plurality and diversity
vis-à-vis the Bundesrat model, because 60 or more independent senators would
have occupied the functional positions of the much smaller number of state prime
ministers. Moreover, each of the numerous senators would have had to share his or
her political loyalties between their electoral constituencies and their political parties.
Both factors would have made it much harder to organize majorities in the Bundesrat
along party lines than practical experience under the Grundgesetz has shown. As a
consequence, the discrepancy in political culture between times of small and large
coalitions would have developed much narrower. Presumably, the metaphor of the
two faces of German bicameralism would not apply.
The Grundgesetz of May 23, 1949, however, decided against a Senate model
and in favor of the Bundesrat model we practice today. To that extent, the two
alternating faces of German bicameralism result from a particular historical decision
on constitutional design. Judging from the political results of the previous 65
years, this decision was a relative success. Different from some comparative
constitutional experiences reported in this online symposium, the composition
of the second chamber of the Federal Republic of Germany was not subject to
substantial constitutional reform. Rather, the criticism of phenomena of systematic
stalemate in times of small coalition-bicameralism has been mitigated through textual
constitutional reforms intended to reduce the subjects of federal in favor of state
legislation.
- 3 -
